The Great Firewall of China
The Great Firewall of China also referred, as the “Golden Shield” is a censorship and surveillance project run by the Ministry of Public Security, which is a division of the government of China. This Internet censorship system does not aim for complete control, but only to prevent “major breaches in the firewall”. The Chinese National People’s Congress claims that it is against the law to “incite subversion”, “divulge state secrets” or “organise cults” on the Internet (Healy 2007, p.158). In 2005, the government prohibited the posting of nine types of information online. These include political and social issues and even nationalism.
Nine types of Information prohibited online:
If the issue is perceived as a threat to the government the discussion becomes illegal and the person responsible for its publication is punished. The government decides if the information or issue threatens the regime and is, therefore, illegal. Speaking against the constitution, socialist ideology and the CCP regime is forbidden.
Such laws are essential to promote the good and eliminate the bad, encourage the healthy development of the Internet and to safeguard the security of the country and the public interest. This surveillance system also targets pornographic websites, along with sites critical of the Communist Party, including other governments, religious groups and political organisations. Websites that contains content related to freedom in Tibet, Taiwanese independence and the Tiananmen Square Massacre and also strictly monitored and controlled. Websites such as Wikipedia or BBC Chinese language news service are blocked. State censors also target websites that reveal official corruption. On January 8 2007, police blocked access to a site that revealed local corruption and monitored city politics.
Of the websites blocked by Chinese censors, pornographic sites lead the list (39 percent), followed by mention of major historical events (14 percent), hate speech (13 percent), gay and lesbian sites (11 percent) and email providers (10 percent). Sex education sites (8 percent), gambling sites (8 percent), those that sell provocative attire (6 percent), news outlets (6 percent) and sites enabling the circumvention of censors (5 percent) complete the list (Healy 2007, p.158). This censorship system is executed by, both public and private bodies. The Chinese government, through nine state-licensed companies, employs between 30,000 to 35,000 Internet police individuals whose job effectively block access to thousands of websites.
Healy (2007, p.158) states that Internet cafes are greatly popular amongst China’s youth, mostly due to the fact that they are unable to afford home computers. The cafes are a critical component in the state censorship system. These Internet cafes employ security guards to monitor the activity of users by watching closed-circuit televisions linked to the local police station. They also utilize software called Internet Detective to record site visits, emails, and message boards. Licenses are required to operate the cafes; 47,000 were shut down in 2004 alone for failure to meet this requirement.
China’s surveillance of the Internet reaches into the emerging world of web logs. All bloggers are required to register with the government and use filter tools that blocks subversive content. Despite these stringent regulations, there are over 175 million Chinese citizens who blog, and 75 million consult these websites for further information relevant to pop culture and occasionally political stories. In 2009 China became the country with the largest number of Internet users, which is approximately 338 million (Chi 2012, p.388). With all its stringent rules and legislation still in force, especially towards free speech on the media, it is a major challenge for China and its people to achieve democracy and liberalisation.
Nine types of Information prohibited online:
- Information critical to the constitution.
- Information that endangers national security, reveals state secrets, undermines state sovereignty, or threatens national unity.
- Information that harms national dignity and interests.
- Information that provokes hatred and discrimination among nationalities and harms national solidarity
- Information that undermines state religious policy and advocates cult and feudal superstitions.
- Information that disseminates rumours, disrupts social order, and harms social stability
- Information that disseminates obscenity or pornography or promotes gambling, violence, murder or terrorism.
- Information that defames or slanders other or impinges on the legal interests of others.
- Information that is otherwise prohibited by law and administrative regulations.
If the issue is perceived as a threat to the government the discussion becomes illegal and the person responsible for its publication is punished. The government decides if the information or issue threatens the regime and is, therefore, illegal. Speaking against the constitution, socialist ideology and the CCP regime is forbidden.
Such laws are essential to promote the good and eliminate the bad, encourage the healthy development of the Internet and to safeguard the security of the country and the public interest. This surveillance system also targets pornographic websites, along with sites critical of the Communist Party, including other governments, religious groups and political organisations. Websites that contains content related to freedom in Tibet, Taiwanese independence and the Tiananmen Square Massacre and also strictly monitored and controlled. Websites such as Wikipedia or BBC Chinese language news service are blocked. State censors also target websites that reveal official corruption. On January 8 2007, police blocked access to a site that revealed local corruption and monitored city politics.
Of the websites blocked by Chinese censors, pornographic sites lead the list (39 percent), followed by mention of major historical events (14 percent), hate speech (13 percent), gay and lesbian sites (11 percent) and email providers (10 percent). Sex education sites (8 percent), gambling sites (8 percent), those that sell provocative attire (6 percent), news outlets (6 percent) and sites enabling the circumvention of censors (5 percent) complete the list (Healy 2007, p.158). This censorship system is executed by, both public and private bodies. The Chinese government, through nine state-licensed companies, employs between 30,000 to 35,000 Internet police individuals whose job effectively block access to thousands of websites.
Healy (2007, p.158) states that Internet cafes are greatly popular amongst China’s youth, mostly due to the fact that they are unable to afford home computers. The cafes are a critical component in the state censorship system. These Internet cafes employ security guards to monitor the activity of users by watching closed-circuit televisions linked to the local police station. They also utilize software called Internet Detective to record site visits, emails, and message boards. Licenses are required to operate the cafes; 47,000 were shut down in 2004 alone for failure to meet this requirement.
China’s surveillance of the Internet reaches into the emerging world of web logs. All bloggers are required to register with the government and use filter tools that blocks subversive content. Despite these stringent regulations, there are over 175 million Chinese citizens who blog, and 75 million consult these websites for further information relevant to pop culture and occasionally political stories. In 2009 China became the country with the largest number of Internet users, which is approximately 338 million (Chi 2012, p.388). With all its stringent rules and legislation still in force, especially towards free speech on the media, it is a major challenge for China and its people to achieve democracy and liberalisation.
China: Internet Censorship
The development of Internet and communication technology has brought change to the world of politics ever since it first came about. The spread and availability of Internet services has formed a new public sphere for political participation. The Internet allows people to access a wide range of political information. This form of technology has enabled people to be more politically involved and the features of the Internet have reduced obstructions to gathering information and having discussions (Chi 2012, p.387). Rheingold (cited in Chi 2012) states that the Internet allows direct democracy. For example, some countries in the Middle East have experienced governmental changes, called the Arab Spring. Citizens who were unhappy or dissatisfied with the ruling government or political leaders had shared their opinions online and assembled protests. The Arab Spring revolution proves that new technology has led to political participation.
However, ICT has enabled political authority to screen the flow of information and censor content on the Internet. In this case, China’s authoritarian regime has a strong motivation to control, monitor and censor the activities of people (Chi 2012, p.388). After the Arab Spring began in 2010, several dissidents in China posted up their opinions on the web, urging people to demand for democracy and human rights. However, the Chinese government swiftly censored the Internet and detained some dissidents.
Human expression is censored in Chinese social media in two ways. First is the “Great Firewall of China”, which prohibits certain websites from operating in the country. The Great Firewall is a prominent issue for foreign Internet firms, and for the Chinese people interacting with others outside of China on these services. However, it does little to limit expressive power of Chinese people who can find other platforms to express themselves. For example, Facebook is blocked in China but RenRen is a close alternative. Twitter, which is also unavailable, has a close substitute which is called Sina Weibo. Second is “keyword blocking” which prevents a user from posting content that has banned words or phrases. This has a small effect on freedom of speech, since Internet users do not find it difficult to bypass automated programs. They use analogies, metaphors, satire and other evasions (King, Pan and Robers 2013).
The change that has been occurring on the Internet in China has formed two different perspectives about the Internet and Chinese political change. Scholars have predicted a gradual transition to democracy through increased Internet participation in China (Hung & Lee cited in Chi 2012). Some have claimed that the Chinese government has shown various feedbacks to citizens’ online demands. Government responses include regulations and also acceptance and accommodation of online demands (Yang & Zheng cited in Chi 2012). Then there are others who claim that because the Chinese government controls online participation and restricts Internet activities, the Internet will not become a tool that would effect in political change toward democracy (Chi 2012, p.388).
During the early development of Internet in China, democracy and liberalization were the first most frequently discussed issues. Dissidents who were against the Chinese authoritarian system used the Internet to avoid censorship from the government in the 1980s. Then, nationalistic issues were discussed on the Internet. However, since 2000 the issues have become more diversified (Chi 2012, p.391). Some of the major online issues in China are listed below (from 1989 to 2007):
However, ICT has enabled political authority to screen the flow of information and censor content on the Internet. In this case, China’s authoritarian regime has a strong motivation to control, monitor and censor the activities of people (Chi 2012, p.388). After the Arab Spring began in 2010, several dissidents in China posted up their opinions on the web, urging people to demand for democracy and human rights. However, the Chinese government swiftly censored the Internet and detained some dissidents.
Human expression is censored in Chinese social media in two ways. First is the “Great Firewall of China”, which prohibits certain websites from operating in the country. The Great Firewall is a prominent issue for foreign Internet firms, and for the Chinese people interacting with others outside of China on these services. However, it does little to limit expressive power of Chinese people who can find other platforms to express themselves. For example, Facebook is blocked in China but RenRen is a close alternative. Twitter, which is also unavailable, has a close substitute which is called Sina Weibo. Second is “keyword blocking” which prevents a user from posting content that has banned words or phrases. This has a small effect on freedom of speech, since Internet users do not find it difficult to bypass automated programs. They use analogies, metaphors, satire and other evasions (King, Pan and Robers 2013).
The change that has been occurring on the Internet in China has formed two different perspectives about the Internet and Chinese political change. Scholars have predicted a gradual transition to democracy through increased Internet participation in China (Hung & Lee cited in Chi 2012). Some have claimed that the Chinese government has shown various feedbacks to citizens’ online demands. Government responses include regulations and also acceptance and accommodation of online demands (Yang & Zheng cited in Chi 2012). Then there are others who claim that because the Chinese government controls online participation and restricts Internet activities, the Internet will not become a tool that would effect in political change toward democracy (Chi 2012, p.388).
During the early development of Internet in China, democracy and liberalization were the first most frequently discussed issues. Dissidents who were against the Chinese authoritarian system used the Internet to avoid censorship from the government in the 1980s. Then, nationalistic issues were discussed on the Internet. However, since 2000 the issues have become more diversified (Chi 2012, p.391). Some of the major online issues in China are listed below (from 1989 to 2007):
Surprisingly, the Chinese government has responded positively to some of the online issues since 2007 (Yang, cited in Chi 2012). Hung (cited in Chi 2012) states that, these responses have made some scholars to predict that Internet participation will lead to democratization through the mobilization process. While these changes appear to support mobilization, the regulation and censorship enforced by the government indicates that reinforcement theory is valid as well (Chi 2012, p.392). However, some issues linked to democracy still cannot be discussed on the Internet in China.
Censorship in China: Regulations
The government in China has always controlled, monitored and used the media for political stability. For example, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promoted the communist ideology by using the media (Kluver, cited in Chi 2012). Deng Xiaoping, a chinese politician and reformist leader of the People’s Republic China legislated the Four Cardinal Principles in 1980, which highlighted ideological restrictions on the media. For the media, these principles meant adhering to socialist line, making decisions in agreement with democratic centralism, accepting the guidance of the CCP, and to conform strictly to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine. It would be illegal for the media to violate any of these principles and would be subjected to punishment (Hung, cited in Chi 2012). Since the ICT industries’ development, the Chinese government has set up related regulations on the Internet.
Since the development of the ICT industry, the Chinese government has implemented related regulations for the Internet. In 2005, the People’s Republic of China State Council and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) announced rules concerning administration of the Internet. These rules include general Internet content regulations and a mandatory system of licensing and registration for Internet service providers (ISPs) (Harwin & Clark; Lum, cited in Chi 2012). In addition to that, the Chinese government controls Internet use through judicial and administrative methods. This procedure regulates ISPs, Internet users and content.
To control and monitor ISPs, the Chinese government requires them to be connected through a gateway coordinated by the government-owned China Telecom. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) also has the legal authority and jurisdiction to supervise information flows. The MII and MPS together control access to politically sensitive websites, monitor chat rooms and online publications, and regulate Internet cafes. The main purpose of regulating ISPs and Internet users is to censor online information. Internet users are forbidden from sharing or discussing politically sensitive issues by email, in chat rooms, or via bulletin board services (BBSs) (Chi 2012, p.397).
This censorship, on the face of it, targets “superstitious, pornographic, violence-related, gambling and other harmful content and information”. However, the real target is content that the CCP views as politically sensitive (Lum, cited in Chi 2012). Censorship is most stringent around the time of the Tiananmen Square protest’s Memorial Day or the Tibet’s Independence Day. During these times in 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics, the government blocked thousands of websites supposedly because they contained pornography, but in actual truth, these sites addressed politically sensitive issues. The Chinese government then built a Great Firewall system for surveillance of Internet information. Western companies such as Google and Yahoo were considering retreat from the Chinese market due to these surveillance and censorship practices (Hughes, cited in Chi 2012).
However, King, Pan and Roberts (2013) states that there are two distinguished theories of what constitutes the goals of the Chinese regime as implemented in their censorship program, each representing a different perspective on what threatens the stability of the regime. First, is a state critique theory, which suggests that the goal of the Chinese government is to suppress dissidents, and to reduce human expression that criticize the elements of the Chinese state, its policies or its leaders. Second, is the theory of collective action potential. Which is the target of censorship is people who join together to express themselves collectively, stimulated by someone other than the government and seem to have the potential to cause collective action. For example, people who communicate on social media about the same subject about active collective action such as protests and those which are likely to create collective actions are most likely to be censored by the Chinese government (King, Pan and Roberts 2013).
Since the development of the ICT industry, the Chinese government has implemented related regulations for the Internet. In 2005, the People’s Republic of China State Council and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) announced rules concerning administration of the Internet. These rules include general Internet content regulations and a mandatory system of licensing and registration for Internet service providers (ISPs) (Harwin & Clark; Lum, cited in Chi 2012). In addition to that, the Chinese government controls Internet use through judicial and administrative methods. This procedure regulates ISPs, Internet users and content.
To control and monitor ISPs, the Chinese government requires them to be connected through a gateway coordinated by the government-owned China Telecom. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) also has the legal authority and jurisdiction to supervise information flows. The MII and MPS together control access to politically sensitive websites, monitor chat rooms and online publications, and regulate Internet cafes. The main purpose of regulating ISPs and Internet users is to censor online information. Internet users are forbidden from sharing or discussing politically sensitive issues by email, in chat rooms, or via bulletin board services (BBSs) (Chi 2012, p.397).
This censorship, on the face of it, targets “superstitious, pornographic, violence-related, gambling and other harmful content and information”. However, the real target is content that the CCP views as politically sensitive (Lum, cited in Chi 2012). Censorship is most stringent around the time of the Tiananmen Square protest’s Memorial Day or the Tibet’s Independence Day. During these times in 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics, the government blocked thousands of websites supposedly because they contained pornography, but in actual truth, these sites addressed politically sensitive issues. The Chinese government then built a Great Firewall system for surveillance of Internet information. Western companies such as Google and Yahoo were considering retreat from the Chinese market due to these surveillance and censorship practices (Hughes, cited in Chi 2012).
However, King, Pan and Roberts (2013) states that there are two distinguished theories of what constitutes the goals of the Chinese regime as implemented in their censorship program, each representing a different perspective on what threatens the stability of the regime. First, is a state critique theory, which suggests that the goal of the Chinese government is to suppress dissidents, and to reduce human expression that criticize the elements of the Chinese state, its policies or its leaders. Second, is the theory of collective action potential. Which is the target of censorship is people who join together to express themselves collectively, stimulated by someone other than the government and seem to have the potential to cause collective action. For example, people who communicate on social media about the same subject about active collective action such as protests and those which are likely to create collective actions are most likely to be censored by the Chinese government (King, Pan and Roberts 2013).
Case Study: Tiananmen Square Protests
The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, commonly known as the June Fourth Incident, were student-led protests in Beijing and received a wide support from city residents, exposing flaws within the China’s political leadership. The protests were suppressed by the military and had then became known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre as troop with assault rifles and tanks inflicted casualties on unarmed civilians who were blocking the military’s advance towards Tiananmen Square, where students have been protesting and have occupied for seven weeks. The Chinese government condemned the protests as a “counter-revolutionary” riot, and had forbidden all forms of discussion or remembrance of the events ever since. Because the media is fully controlled by the government, many aspects of the events remain unknown, vague and unconfirmed to many people in China.
During the early stages of Internet use, dissidents who opposed socialism and the CCP regime became Internet activists for democracy and liberalisation in China. The Internet became an effective method for discussing politically sensitive issues and mobilising people (Chi 2012, p.398). When the Tiananmen Square protest happened in 1989, the government suppressed the spread of news about the incident. However, the news was transmitted to foreign countries by fax, and then reentered China by email. The news that the government controlled the Tiananmen Square protests was reported in locally and internationally. As the protest came to an end, Internet users abroad witnessed the repression of the protestors’ human rights, so they called for an online movement to secure the protestors’ safe migration to the United States.
The Chinese government attempted to block circulation about the first stage of protests, but was unable to due to the limitations of their technology during that period of time (Kluver, cited in Chi 2012). The efficiency of the Internet during the Tiananmen Square protests had made dissidents actively use the Internet for political agendas. Some launched a campaign for democratisation and liberalisation in China throughout the Internet. These acts are considered illegal by the government as it violates the constitution. The government has prohibited these issues and topics to be discussed and spread on the Internet, and therefore it has been difficult to find such issues on the Internet in China since 2000.
During the early stages of Internet use, dissidents who opposed socialism and the CCP regime became Internet activists for democracy and liberalisation in China. The Internet became an effective method for discussing politically sensitive issues and mobilising people (Chi 2012, p.398). When the Tiananmen Square protest happened in 1989, the government suppressed the spread of news about the incident. However, the news was transmitted to foreign countries by fax, and then reentered China by email. The news that the government controlled the Tiananmen Square protests was reported in locally and internationally. As the protest came to an end, Internet users abroad witnessed the repression of the protestors’ human rights, so they called for an online movement to secure the protestors’ safe migration to the United States.
The Chinese government attempted to block circulation about the first stage of protests, but was unable to due to the limitations of their technology during that period of time (Kluver, cited in Chi 2012). The efficiency of the Internet during the Tiananmen Square protests had made dissidents actively use the Internet for political agendas. Some launched a campaign for democratisation and liberalisation in China throughout the Internet. These acts are considered illegal by the government as it violates the constitution. The government has prohibited these issues and topics to be discussed and spread on the Internet, and therefore it has been difficult to find such issues on the Internet in China since 2000.